Abstract
Introduction
The idea of identity based cryptography (IBC) was first given by Shamir in the year 1984 [1] , IBC is not only simple to use but also more efficient as compare to traditional public key cryptography (PKC). But a fully functional identity-based scheme was proposed recently in 2001 by Boneh and Franklin [3] , they designed practical ID-based encryption scheme using bilinear pairing on elliptic curves with security proof in a random oracle. Since then, a large number of identity-based authenticated key agreement (ID-AK) protocols based on the pairing idea have been proposed [4] [5] [6] [7] .In the year 2002 Smart [8] proposed the first ID-AK protocol using Weil pairings in the same year Chen and kudla [6] proposed some more ID-AK protocol by modifying Smart's protocol. Since then many other authors proposed many identity-based protocols with or without key escrow property. But most of them used pairing which is time consuming as well as costly. Recently, Zhu [11] and Cao. [12, 13] proposed paring free identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols which are computationally efficient and secure.
Therefore, this paper presents a pairing free efficient identity-based authenticated key agreement (ID-AK) protocol without key escrow mode and having all the security attributes as defined by Blake-Wilson. [2] with minimum computational cost.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the basics concept of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Identity-based cryptosystem (IBC), and some of the computationally hard problems on `the elliptic curve group.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Let E P (a, b) be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime field F P , defined by the non-singular elliptic curve equation: y 2 mod p = (x 3 +ax+b) mod p with a, b ϵ F P and (4a 3 + 27b 2 ) mod P ≠ 0.
Proposed Scheme
The protocol consists of three phases, the set-up, key generation and key agreement phases.
Set Up
The PKG takes the secret parameter k and a master key s and performs the following:
1. Choose a k-bit prime p and determine the tuple {F q , E/F q, Gp, P}.
2.
Choose the master secret key s ϵ Z * q and compute the system public key P pub =sP. k . 4. Then PKG publishes public system parameters { F q , E/F q, Gp, P, H 1 , H 2 } and keeps the master secret s secret.
Key Generation
The PKG takes as input the system parameters, master key and users identifier, carries out the computations and then returns the users ID-based long-term private key. For a user, A, with a particular online identifier, e.g. ID A , the PKG by using the key generation algorithm, works as follows:
1. Map a user's online identifier ID A to an integer elements, e.g. H 1 :{ID A }-›a ϵ Z q .
2. Compute A's public key as A pub = (a + s) P and A's private key as A pri =(a + s) -1 P. 3. In a similar manner, the algorithm generates B's pair of public and private keys as B pub = (b + s) P and B pri = (b + s) -1 P, respectively. 
Security Analysis
The proposed protocol satisfies all the security properties as defined by Blake-Wilson.
[2] and we are now going to discuss them.
Known Session Specific Temporary Attack
User A and B computes the session key as SK = H 2 (ID A ||ID B ||T A ||T B ||K AB ), security of which is depends on the secrecy of K AB = xyP. However, if the session ephemeral secrets x and y are exposed to an adversary, but he cannot computes the session key SK. He can generate the session key if he knows xyP. However, knowing the pair (T A , T B ) = (xP, yP) from which computation of xyP is impossible due to difficulties of solving the CDHP problem. Therefore, the known-session specific temporary information attack is not possible.
Key Off Set Attack
In our protocol, user A sends the message (ID A , T A , S A ) to B. Suppose that the adversary E modifies it to (ID A ,T 
Known Key Security
Even if one session key is compromised, still more other session keys apart from the compromised ones remain secure. This is simply because every session key is unique due to the randomly chosen ephemeral key for each protocol run. Therefore, an attacker would not know any other session key from the knowledge of a compromised one because the session key computation depends on the random ephemeral keys, which is given by SK = H 2 (ID A ||ID B ||T A ||T B ||K AB )
Key Compromise Impersonation Attack
Assume that A's secret key is exposed to an adversary, and then he tries to impersonate B to A for obtaining the resulting session key. This security attribute is well satisfied in the protocol because any sender of a message endorses its authenticity by sending a verifiable signature component, S A = xA pri + H (ID A ||T A ) A pri , that proves the ownership of the ID and corresponding public key. Therefore, without knowledge of the private key, B pri = (b+s) -1 P for B, (as an entity to be impersonated), no adversary can form a verifiable signature component S B . Therefore, the proposed protocol secures against keycompromise impersonation attack.
No Key Control
In our scheme, both participants A and B have an input into the session key neither participant can force the full session key to be a preselected value. The session key in our protocol is determined jointly by both participants A and B. Thus SK=H 2 (ID A ||ID B ||T A ||T B ||K AB ),depends on T A = xP and T B = yP , and these are generated by A and B respectively. Therefore, any single user cannot control the outcome of the session keys or enforce others.
Perfect Forward Security and PKG Forward Security
If the secret keys of A and B are compromised, it does not allow an adversary to recover any past session keys. The adversary may compute the session key SK if he knows K AB = xyP T A and T B . Suppose T A and T B are disclosed to adversary, he cannot compute K AB due to hardness of CDHP problem. From this discussion one can see that, if the secret key of PKG is disclosed, the secret key of all participants are compromised, but the current or past session keys are still secured. Thus, the perfect forward security and PKG forward security are preserved in our protocol.
Efficiency Analysis
In this section we compare our protocol with other existing protocol in terms of pairing, scalar multiplication, exponentiation and group addition. From the table 1 it is shown that proposed protocol is more computational efficient than others. The proposed protocol does not involve pairing or exponentiation, where as protocols [8] and [10] includes pairing and exponentiation which increases the cost. The protocols [11, 12 and 13] do not involve pairing or exponentiation, but their computational cost is overweighed by more number of scalar multiplication and group addition. Therefore proposed protocol is computational more efficient. 
Conclusion
This paper presented an efficient ID-based key agreement protocol that is pairing and escrow-free. The protocol achieves all the desirable security attributes with minimum computational cost based on the ECDLP and CDHP problems. In addition to the security properties of no key control, unknown key share resilience and known key security, the proposed protocol also provides KCI resilience and PFS, which are properties lacking in many other ID-based key agreement protocols. The proposed protocol integrates a signature component in the message flow for common key computations, which ensures message integrity and the authenticity of the source of the message. The merit of the protocol is that it achieves security at a very low computational cost, making it ideal for applications adhoc devices like MANET.
